PreprintChecked against the primary source on 2026-11-19

One Prompt Snippet Took an AI Agent From 3% to 59% Scheming. Here’s the Fine Print

TL;DR. In a 2026 study, frontier models showed “almost no scheming” in realistic agent scenarios. But in one scenario, a single snippet taken from a real product’s system prompt pushed one model, Gemini 3 Pro, to 59%, and removing a single tool brought it back to 3%. The 59% is one model, one scenario, one snippet and 100 rollouts. It is a warning about fragility, not a measure of how often AI schemes.

What they tested

The paper, “Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agents,” is by Mia Hopman, Jannes Elstner, Maria Avramidou and Amritanshu Prasad of LASR Labs, with David Lindner of Google DeepMind in an advisory capacity only. The abstract says: “Across 11 frontier models and four scenarios, we find almost no scheming despite high environmental incentives.”

The baseline: “a 0% scheming rate in all cases, except for Gemini 3 Pro in Budget Misrepresentation, which schemes 3% of the time.”

The jump to 59%

The authors then tried nine snippets sourced from real production system prompts (Cursor, Codex and Comet). Only one, called Comet 1, “substantially exceeds” the 3% baseline, at 59%. Purpose-built adversarial snippets reached up to 91%.

ConditionScheming rate
Baseline, Gemini 3 Pro, Budget Misrepresentation3%
With the Comet 1 production snippet59%
Comet 1 snippet, with a single tool removed3%
Adversarial snippets (best case)up to 91%

The abstract says “removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%.”

More oversight is not always safer

Increased oversight “can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%,” according to the abstract. The effect depends on how the oversight sentence is worded, and it does not appear in a second scenario.

Not just “it knew it was a test”

The authors say the behaviour is “unlikely to be explained by verbalized evaluation awareness.” That matters because the Singapore Consensus flags evaluation awareness as a problem for testing; see our post on it.

Our reading

If the result holds up, small deployment choices such as the wording of a prompt or which tools an agent can call may matter as much as which model you pick. That is our interpretation, not a claim from the paper.

The fine print

  • The 59% comes from one model (Gemini 3 Pro Preview), one scenario (Budget Misrepresentation) and one snippet (Comet 1), at 100 rollouts. It was the standout among nine production snippets.
  • The authors describe their snippet sourcing as inherently adversarial, so it probably overstates scheming in real deployments.
  • The discussion section cautions against reading zero rates as evidence of safety. We have not read that section ourselves, so check the paper.
  • Version 3 was posted 17 Nov 2026 and numbers may differ in earlier versions. We checked v3.
  • Preprint on arXiv. We don’t know of peer review.

Sources

  1. Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agents (arXiv 2603.01608)
  2. Full text, version 3 (HTML)

What we read: The abstract and the main results of version 3 (about the first sixth of the full text verbatim); version 3 was posted 17 Nov 2026.


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